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YES, I DESTROYED THE EVIDENCE –
SUE ME? INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION
OF EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS
MICHAEL A. ZUCKERMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many Illinois litigators have encountered spoliation of evidence,
which is the loss, destruction, or alteration of evidence.1 Examples of
spoliation are seemingly endless and include the failure to preserve the
scene of a train derailment,2 the accidental destruction of evidence on a
lawyer’s desk by a janitor,3 the loss of a heater that exploded,4 the removal of wires from a car that caught on fire,5 the loss and alteration of
medical equipment,6 and the intentional erasing of a computer image
relevant to a copyright lawsuit.7 To combat spoliation, Illinois and many
other states have developed common law and statutory methods to remedy and deter spoliation.
Illinois’ spoliation law, however, is somewhat unclear. Although Illinois does not recognize negligent spoliation as an independent cause of
action, a party can state such a claim under traditional negligence law.8
That is, a litigant can bring an ordinary negligence claim for spoliation of
evidence; the law need not make any special provision.9 In contrast to
* The author is a member of the Illinois Bar. He earned his J.D., with honors, at
Cornell Law School, and his undergraduate degree at Cornell University. The author
would like to thank the editors of the Journal for their assistance.
1. See, e.g., Midwest Trust Servs., Inc. v. Catholic Health Partners Servs., 910 N.E.2d
638, 642-43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2009).
2. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. ABC-NACO, 389 Ill. App. 3d 691, 710-15
(Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
3. See, e.g., Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co, 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985).
4. See, e.g., Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 269 (Ill. 1995).
5. See, e.g., Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Village Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 223 Ill. App. 3d 624 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1992).
6. See, e.g., Midwest Trust Servs., 910 N.E.2d 638.
7. See, e.g., Mohawk Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Lakes Tool Die & Eng’g, Inc., No. 92 CV
1315, 1994 WL 85979, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 1994).
8. Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1995).
9. Id.
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negligent spoliation, whether Illinois permits an independent cause of
action for intentional spoliation remains an “open question.”10 The Illinois Supreme Court has expressly declined to decide the question,11 and
courts applying Illinois law are split.12
This Article argues that Illinois should recognize the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence. Section I discusses spoliation generally, including its history and status in jurisdictions throughout the nation.
Section II considers spoliation under Illinois law and examines the leading case of Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Company.13 The Section also
considers the availability of judicial sanctions for spoliation of evidence
in federal courts sitting in Illinois, namely Rule 37 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the inherent power doctrine.14 Under either approach, the trial court has broad discretion to fashion an appropriate
sanction.15 The sanction of dismissal or default judgment, though, is reserved for the most serious bad-faith conduct, including, perhaps, the
fabrication of evidence.16
Section III argues that Illinois should resolve the uncertainty in its
spoliation law by recognizing an independent cause of action for intentional spoliation of evidence. Specifically, it argues that adopting the
tort of intentional spoliation will further the policy interests of deterrence, remediation, and certainty. The Section also details how existing
sanctions for spoliation are often not enough. The Article concludes by
arguing that any concerns raised by recognizing the tort of intentional
spoliation do not outweigh the benefits of doing so.
II. SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
A. BACKGROUND
Spoliation of evidence refers to the “act of damaging evidence.”17
The precise definition of spoliation, however, varies greatly across juris10. See Jones v. O’Brien Tire & Battery Serv. Ctr., Inc., 871 N.E.2d 98, 115 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2007).
11. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d 267.
12. See Midwest Trust Servs., Inc. v. Catholic Health Partners Servs., 910 N.E.2d 638
(Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see also Jones, 871 N.E.2d at 115; see also Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Village Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 223 Ill. App. 3d 624 (1992).
13. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d 267.
14. See infra Part II(c).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Shannon D. Hutchings, Note, Tortious Liability for Spoliation of Evidence, 24 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 381, 383 (2000). The word “spoliation” is derived from the Latin phrase
omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorum, which means “all things are presumed against a
despoilor or wrongdoer.” Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1087 (1987).
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dictions. At its narrowest, spoliation is defined as the “intentional destruction of evidence . . . or the significant and meaningful alteration of a
document or instrument.”18 Most jurisdictions reject this narrow approach and define spoliation more broadly to include “the destruction or
significant alteration of evidence or the failure to preserve property for
another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.”19 The Sixth Circuit in an older case recited perhaps the broadest
definition of spoliation when it suggested that spoliation “occurs along a
continuum of fault ranging from innocence through the degrees of negligence to intentionality.”20 In Illinois, courts define spoliation as the “destruction, mutilation, alteration, or concealment of evidence.”21
Although jurisdictions vary, spoliation claims can be divided into either claims of negligent spoliation or intentional spoliation.22 Negligent
spoliation is predicated on the existence of a duty to preserve evidence.
To make out a claim—either independently or under existing negligence
law—a party must show the following: 1) the existence of a lawsuit or
potential lawsuit; 2) a duty that the spoliator owes to preserve the evidence or potential evidence; 3) the spoliator’s breach of this duty; and 4)
damages to the non-spoliator that the breach proximately caused.23
In contrast to negligent spoliation, intentional spoliation assumes
the existence of a duty and instead focuses on a party’s intent to thwart
another party’s claim by manipulating evidence.24 To make out a claim
of intentional spoliation, the moving party generally must show: 1) pending or probable litigation; 2) defendant’s knowledge of such litigation; 3)
defendant’s willful destruction of evidence for the purpose of thwarting
the litigation; 4) disruption of the litigation; and 5) damages that the
18. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990).
19. See, e.g., West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
20. Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988).
21. Midwest Trust Servs., Inc. v. Catholic Health Partners Servs., 910 N.E.2d 638, 643
(2009) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 (7th ed. 1999)).
22. Regardless of the label that one attaches to spoliation, many share the same negative view. See, e.g., Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat’l Bank, 109 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir.
1940) (noting that spoliation is “synonymous with pillaging, plundering, and robbing”); Stefan Rubin, Tort Reform: A Call for Florida to Scale Back its Independent Tort for the Spoliation of Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 345, 346 (1999) (noting that spoliation implicates the
“integrity of the judicial system”). Spoliation is not a new concept; the common law developed a number of methods to address spoliation. See Bart S. Wilhoit, Comment, Spoliation
of Evidence: The Viability of Four Emerging Torts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 631, 633, 637-39
(1998). Yet modern technology has forced many jurisdictions to apply traditional spoliation law to digital evidence. See generally Steven W. Teppler, Spoliation of Digital Evidence: Changing Approach to Challenges and Sanctions, 4 SCI. TECH. LAWYER 22 (2007).
23. See, e.g., Joe Wetzel, Spoliating an Illinois Personal Injury Plaintiff’s Spoliation
Claim for Routinely Maintained Items, 28 S. ILL. L.J. 455, 461 (2004).
24. See Welch v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 04 CV 50023, 2004 WL 1510021, at *4
(N.D. Ill. July 1, 2004).
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destruction proximately caused.25
The leading case on intentional spoliation is Smith v. Superior
Court,26 a 1984 California decision that recognized intentional spoliation
as an independent cause of action under California law.27 In Smith, the
plaintiff was driving southbound in her car, while the defendant’s van
proceeded northbound on the same road.28 As the vehicles approached
each other, the left rear wheel flew off the defendant’s van and crashed
through the plaintiff’s front window.29 Upon impact, glass flew into the
plaintiff’s eyes and face, which caused the plaintiff to sustain permanent
blindness and loss of smell.30 At some point after the accident, Abbot
Ford, a representative of the dealership that customized the wheels on
the defendant’s van, took possession of the wheel that injured the plaintiff.31 Abbott subsequently “destroyed, lost, or transferred” the wheel,
rendering it impossible for the plaintiff to determine the cause of the
accident.32
The plaintiff brought suit against Abbot, alleging a number of causes
of action including spoliation of evidence.33 Abbot moved to dismiss the
spoliation counts, and the trial court granted his motion, holding that a
cause of action for intentional spoliation does not exist under California
law.34 The plaintiff appealed, and the California Supreme Court reversed.35 Against a common law backdrop that extends a civil remedy to
every legal wrong, the court held the policy considerations weighed in
favor of the plaintiff.36 The court downplayed policy concerns about permitting an independent cause of action, and opined that any concerns
about difficulties in computing damages and finality were not that
grave.37 Such concerns could be minimized, and, in any event, placing
25. See, e.g., Owca v. Fed. Ins. Co., 95 Fed. Appx. 742, 745 (6th Cir. 2004). Note that
some jurisdictions even recognize reckless spoliation. See, e.g., Nix v. Hoke, 139 F. Supp.
2d 125, 136 n.10 (D.D.C. 2001).
26. See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), overruled by,
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 519 n.3 (Cal. 1998); see also MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 83 (Daniel F. Gourash, ed., 2006).
27. See Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829; see generally Wilhoit, supra note 24, at 640-43 (noting that “[t]he most significant development in the evolution of the tort of spoliation occurred” in Smith).
28. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
35. Id. at 831.
36. Id. at 831-37.
37. Id. at 835.

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\27-2\SFT202.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 5

17-JUN-10

YES, I DESTROYED THE EVIDENCE – SUE ME?

8:47

239

too much weight here would undercut the value of deterrence.38
Smith represents but one jurisdiction’s approach to intentional spoliation at one fixed point in time. Indeed, the nature and scope of spoliation law varies across the nation.39 A recent publication notes that “only
a minority of state high courts have recognized an independent claim for
spoliation of evidence.”40 These jurisdictions include the District of Columbia,41 Alabama,42 Alaska,43 Montana,44 New Mexico,45 Ohio,46 and
West Virginia.47 Yet, many jurisdictions have declined to recognize the
tort of spoliation.48 Some jurisdictions, including Illinois,49 Idaho,50
Louisiana,51 New Jersey,52 and Pennsylvania,53 recognize a quasi-cause
of action that permits a plaintiff to state a claim for spoliation under an
existing cause of action such as negligence.
B. SPOLIATION

OF

EVIDENCE

IN

ILLINOIS

Any discussion of spoliation law in Illinois must begin with Boyd v.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Met. Life Auto & Home Co. v. Joe Basil Chevrolet, Inc., 809 N.E.2d 835
(N.Y. 2004); Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 2003); Rosenbilt v. Zimmerman, 766
A.3d 749 (N.J. 2001); Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429 (Ala. 2000); Nicholas v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300 (Alaska 2000); Oliver v. Stimson, 991 P.3d 11 (Mont. 1999);
Holmes v. Amerex Rent-a-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Elias v. Lancaster Gen.
Hosp., 710 A.2d 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Bethea v. Modern Biomedical Servs., Inc., 704 So.
2d 1227 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Coleman v. Potas, 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995).
40. See KOESEL & TURNBULL supra note 28, at 81.
41. Holmes, 710 A.2d at 847.
42. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429.
43. Nicholas, 6 P.3d 300; Hazen v. Anchorage, 718 F.2d 456 (Alaska 1986).
44. Oliver, 991 P.3d 11.
45. Coleman, 905 P.2d at 189.
46. Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993). Ohio answered the
question of whether it recognizes intentional spoliation as an independent tort upon a certified question from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Id. at 1038.
The court held that the elements of intentional spoliation are the following: 1) pending or
probable litigation involving the plaintiff; 2) knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation exists or is probable; 3) willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt
the plaintiff’s case; 4) disruption of the plaintiff’s case; and 5) damages proximately caused
by the defendant’s acts. Id.
47. Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 567 (W. Va. 2003).
48. Met. Life Auto & Home Co. v. Joe Basil Chevrolet, Inc., 809 N.E.2d 835 (N.Y.
2004).
49. Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ill. 1995).
50. Ricketts v. Eastern Idaho Equip. Co., 51 P.3d 392 (Idaho 2002); Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 416 (Idaho 1996).
51. Bethea, et al. v. Modern Biomedical Servs., Inc., 704 So. 2d 1227 (La. Ct. App.
1997).
52. Rosenbilt v. Zimmerman, 766 A.3d 749, 758 (N.J. 2001).
53. Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67-69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
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Travelers Insurance Co,54 which has been termed the Illinois Supreme
Court’s “watershed pronouncement” on the matter.55 In Boyd, Tommie
and Fannie Boyd brought actions for both negligent and intentional spoliation against Tommie Boyd’s employer’s workers’ compensation insurer
after the insurer had misplaced a propane heater that was central to the
plaintiffs’ products liability claim.56
The events leading up to the claim began on February 4, 1990, when
Tommie Boyd used a propane catalytic heater to keep himself warm
while using his employer’s van.57 An explosion occurred and Boyd was
severely injured; plaintiffs alleged the heater caused the explosion.58
After the explosion, plaintiffs filed a claim against Boyd’s employer
and its insurer, Travelers, for workers compensation benefits.59 Then,
on February 6, 1990, two Travelers representatives visited the plaintiffs’
residence and took possession of the heater that allegedly caused the explosion.60 In removing the heater, the employees told Fannie Boyd,
Tommie’s wife, that they needed the heater in order to investigate the
cause of the accident.61 The employees brought the heater to a Travelers
office and thereafter “stored it in a closet.”62
The relevant controversy arose when plaintiffs requested that Travelers return the heater.63 After Travelers refused, claiming it had inadvertently misplaced the heater, plaintiffs filed suit on September 27,
1991, seeking to compel the heater’s return.64 In its answer to the suit,
Travelers admitted that it had lost the heater and had not tested it while
it was in its possession.65 As a result, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit
against Travelers, alleging, among other things, that they suffered injury and irrevocable prejudice arising from “Travelers’ loss of the
heater[,] because no expert could testify with certainty as to whether the
heater was defective or dangerously designed.”66 Travelers filed a motion to dismiss the spoliation allegations, which the trial court granted,
even though it stated that Illinois would recognize an independent cause
54. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d 267. In Illinois, spoliation of evidence is the non-preservation of
evidence relevant to pending or future litigation. See Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 271; Adams v.
Bath & Body Works, 830 N.E.2d 645, 654 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
55. Darden v. Kueling, 213 Ill. 2d 329, 335 (Ill. 2004).
56. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 269.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 269.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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of action for spoliation “given the right facts.”67 The trial court reasoned
that the “plaintiffs’ claims were premature unless and until they lost the
underlying suit against [the manufacturer].”68 The plaintiffs subsequently took their appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.69
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that Illinois, like a “majority of
jurisdictions,” had not recognized spoliation as an independent cause of
action.70 Although courts have “long afforded redress for the destruction
of evidence,” the court opined that traditional remedies were sufficient to
address the problem.71
The court held that the plaintiffs could state a claim for negligent
spoliation under existing negligence law, but reserved judgment on
whether intentional spoliation is actionable under Illinois law.72 The
court analyzed the claim under the traditional negligence principles,
finding that the plaintiffs alleged “sufficient facts supporting the theory
that they have suffered an inability to succeed in their otherwise valid
products liability action against [the manufacturer].”73
1. Types of Spoliation
a.

Negligent Spoliation

As explained above, Boyd made clear that Illinois law does not recognize the tort of negligent spoliation74; rather, it permits a party to state
such a claim under traditional negligence law.75 It follows that to state a
claim for negligent spoliation under Illinois law, a party must plead the
four traditional elements of negligence: 1) existence of a duty; 2) breach
of that duty; 3) proximate causation; and 4) damages.76
Turning to the first element,77 although one does not generally owe
67. Id.
68. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 267. The trial court dismissed these claims without prejudice,
thus permitting the plaintiffs the opportunity to re-file their spoliation action after resolution of the underlying products liability action against the manufacturer. Id. at 269.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 270 & n.1 (collecting cases).
71. Id.
72. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270-73.
73. Id. at 272.
74. Id. at 270.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing inter alia, Estate of Johnson v. Condell Mem. Hosp., 119 Ill. 2d 496, 503
(Ill. 1988)); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. ABC-NACO, 906 N.E.2d 83,
100-01 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Wetzel, supra note 25, at 457-59.
77. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270; see generally James T. Killelea, Spoliation of Evidence:
Proposals for New York State, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1045, 1049-52 (1995) (discussing the existence of duty in a spoliation action and opining that “[s]poliation liability arises from a
party’s duty to preserve evidence”).
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a duty to preserve evidence,78 such a duty may arise in certain circumstances,79 even prior to litigation.80 To determine whether a duty exists,
Illinois courts apply a two-step process,81 considering first whether the
defendant assumed a duty through agreement, contract, statute, other
special circumstance, or voluntarily assumption,82 and, if so, whether a
“reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have foreseen the
evidence was material to a potential civil action.”83
The next element is breach, where the plaintiff must show that the
spoliating party did not “take reasonable measures to preserve the integrity of relevant and material evidence.”84 The third element, causation,
requires the plaintiff to allege the spoliation “caused the plaintiff to be
unable to prove an underlying lawsuit.”85 The causation element is particularly difficult to prove.86 The plaintiff need not prove that she would
have otherwise prevailed in the action; instead, the plaintiff must prove
that but for the spoliation, she would have had a “reasonable probability
of succeeding in the underlying suit.”87 Finally, the fourth element is
damages, under which the plaintiff must plead “actual damages,” such
as “an inability to succeed” in an otherwise valid action.88
b.

Intentional Spoliation
It is an “open question” whether Illinois recognizes an independent

78. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270-71.
79. Id. at 270.
80. See, e.g., Shimanovsky v. Gen Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ill. 1998) (noting
that plaintiff’s duty in this regard is premised on the “court’s concern that, were it unable
to sanction a party for pre-suit destruction of evidence, a potential litigant could . . . simply
[destroy] the proof prior to the filing of a complaint”).
81. See Dardeen v. Kuehling, 821 N.E.2d 227, 232 (Ill. 2004).
82. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270.
83. Id. at 272; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. ABC-NACO, 906
N.E.2d 83, 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Jones v. O’Brien Tire & Battery Serv. Ctr., Inc., 752
N.E.2d 8 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
84. Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ill. 1998).
85. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 271, n.2 (opining that plaintiff need not show that plaintiff
would have prevailed but for the spoliation) (emphasis in original); see also Midwest Trust
Servs., Inc. v. Catholic Health Partners Servs., 910 N.E.2d 638, 643 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(dismissing claim for negligent spoliation in a medical malpractice case where plaintiff
“[failed]” to demonstrate that but for the alleged missing cardiac monitoring strips, it had a
reasonable probability of succeeding against [the [doctor] in the underlying medical malpractice action”).
86. See Burlington N., 906 N.E.2d 83; Cangemi v. Advocate South S. Sub. Hosp., 364
Ill. App. 3d 446, 471 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (noting that the success of a spoliation claim often
turns on ability to prevail on the underlying claim).
87. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 271, n.2.
88. Id. at 272.
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cause of action for intentional spoliation.89 Although some lower courts
suggest that “[s]poliation of evidence is not an independent cause of action,” these overly-broad and perhaps sloppy statements generally refer
to negligent spoliation.90 This is because the Illinois Supreme Court has
explicitly declined to decide whether Illinois recognizes an independent
action for intentional spoliation.91
In the aftermath of Boyd, courts applying Illinois law are split as to
whether intentional spoliation exists as an independent tort. 92 On one
hand, many courts have used Boyd’s failure to create a claim for intentional spoliation to bar such claims.93 For instance, in a recent Seventh
Circuit decision applying Illinois law, the court construed a claim for intentional spoliation as a claim for negligent spoliation, reasoning that
Illinois does not support the former claim.94 Similarly, an Illinois state
court dismissed an intentional spoliation claim, reasoning that “plaintiffs cite to no case that specifically recognizes intentional spoliation as a
tort in Illinois.”95
On the other hand, a number of federal district courts have held that
Illinois law does (or would) permit an action for intentional spoliation of
evidence.96 In Williams v. General Motors Corporation,97 for example,
the court permitted an independent cause of action for intentional spoliation under Illinois law, reasoning that “[i]t would make no sense, after
all, for the court to hold a defendant liable for its merely negligent conduct but not for intentional conduct that resulted in the same harm.”98
Similarly, in Broadnax v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc.,99 the court recognized an intentional spoliation claim under Illinois law, but it dismissed
89. Jones v. O’Brien Tire & Battery Serv. Ctr., Inc., 871 N.E.2d 98, 115 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007).
90. See, e.g., Midwest Trust Servs., 910 N.E.2d at 643 (discussing negligence and citing
Boyd); Burlington N., 906 N.E.2d at 100 (stating “Illinois does not treat spoliation of evidence as a separate claim”).
91. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d 267.
92. Compare Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 510 (7th Cir.
2007) (declining to recognize claim) with Broadnax v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., No. 96 CV
1974, 1998 WL 140884, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 1998) (recognizing claim).
93. See, e.g., Borsellino, 477 F.3d at 510; Anthony v. Sec. Pacific Fin. Servs., Inc., 75
F.3d 311, 317 (7th Cir. 1996); Farrar v. Yamin, 261 F. Supp. 2d 987, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003);
Cangemi v. Advocate S. Sub. Hosp., 845 N.E.2d 792, 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
94. See, e.g., Borsellino, 477 F.3d at 510.
95. Cangemi, 845 N.E.2d at 815.
96. See, e.g., Welch v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 04 CV 50023, 2004 WL 1510021, at *4
(N.D. Ill. July 1, 2004).
97. Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 93 CV 6661, 1996 WL 420273, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
July 25, 1996).
98. Id.
99. Broadnax v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., No. 96 CV 1974, 1998 WL 140884, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 26, 1998).
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the claim for insufficient pleading.100
Nonetheless, to the extent Illinois recognizes a claim for intentional
spoliation, the elements of such a claim have been set forth in a pre-Boyd
case from the Northern District of Illinois.101 In Mohawk Manufacturing & Supply Co. v Lakes Tool Die & Engineering, Inc., the plaintiff alleged the defendant intentionally erased material from defendant’s
computer that was copyrighted.102 In considering the claim, the court
set forth the elements of intentional spoliation as: 1) the existence of a
potential civil action; 2) defendant’s knowledge of that action; 3) destruction of relevant evidence; 4) intent; 5) a causal connection between the
destruction and the plaintiff’s inability to prove the claim; and 6)
damages.103
2. Spoliation in Illinois Courts
a.

Sources of Authority

The Rules of the Illinois Supreme Court authorize courts to sanction
parties for failure to preserve evidence.104 Specifically, Rule 219(c) permits a court to sanction a party for failure to comply with discovery rules
or orders handed down under those rules.105 The Illinois Supreme Court
has held that the Rule may even extend to conduct that occurred before
litigation commenced.106 Beyond Rule 219, non-spoliating parties may
also assert a cause of action sounding in traditional negligence law as
discussed above.107
b.

Remedies

Once spoliation has occurred, the next question is what, if any, remedy to apply.108 The typical remedies for spoliation, which either “punish a spoliator or reward an innocent party,”109 are discovery sanctions,
adverse jury inferences,110 preclusion of evidence, and dismissal or de100. Id.
101. See Welch, 2004 WL 1510021, at *4 (citing Mohawk Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Lakes
Tool Die & Eng’g., Inc., No. 92 CV 1315, 1994 WL 85979, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 1994)).
102. Mohawk Mfg., 1994 WL 85979, at *1.
103. Id.; see also Hutchings, supra note 19, at 384 (detailing the elements of intentional
spoliation generally).
104. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c).
105. See KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 28.
106. See, e.g., Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ill. 1998).
107. Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ill. 1995).
108. See, e.g., Kambylis v. Ford Motor Co., 788 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003). For a discussion of remedies in federal court, see supra Section II.B.c.2.
109. Wetzel, supra note 25, at 465.
110. See, e.g., ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION, CIVIL, NO. 5.01 (2000).

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\27-2\SFT202.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 11

17-JUN-10

YES, I DESTROYED THE EVIDENCE – SUE ME?

8:47

245

fault judgment.111 Although criminal penalties might be available,112
“[m]ost courts have a tendency to prefer civil remedies, because, among
other reasons, the criminal sanctions may appear to be too harsh.”113
3. Spoliation in Federal Court
a.

Sources of Authority

Federal courts have two primary sources of authority to sanction
spoliation of evidence.114 The first source is Rule 37 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and the second source is the inherent power doctrine.115 This Article discusses both in turn.
Federal Rule 37 provides federal courts with a rule-based remedy.116 Under Rule 37(b), a district court may sanction a party for failure to comply with a discovery order.117 Although the Rule requires a
violation of a court order, “a formal, written order to comply with discovery is not required.”118 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit in Brandt v. Vulcan,
Inc.119 held that courts have broadly interpreted the meaning of an “order.” 120 Some courts have even held that Rule 37 may extend to conduct
that occurred before the commencement of discovery.121 As one court
noted, “[e]ven though a party may have destroyed evidence prior to issu111. Wetzel, supra note 25, at 465.
112. See Virginia L. H. Nesbitt, Note, A Thoughtless Act of a Single Day: Should Tennessee Recognize Spoliation of Evidence as an Independent Tort?, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 555,
570 (2007).
113. Wetzel, supra note 25, at 465 n.85; see also Nesbitt, supra note 120, at 570 (considering criminal sanctions for spoliation as “theoretical”). For a discussion of criminal penalties for spoliation, see generally Wetzel, supra note 25, at 469-70 n.128-34.
114. See Am. Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Roth, No. 05 CV 3839, 2009 WL 982788, at *4
n.6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2009) (noting the distinction between spoliation under state law and
federal law). Note that no independent cause of action exists for spoliation under federal
law. See, e.g., Trentadue v. United States, 386 F.3d 1322, 1342-43 (10th Cir. 2004); Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001); Lombard v. MCI Telecomm’ns
Corp., 143 F. Supp. 2d 621, 626-27 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
115. See, e.g., Larson v. Bank One Corp., No. 00 CV 2100, 2005 WL 4652509, at *8 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 18, 2005).
116. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
117. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) (listing possible sanctions); United States v. Certain Real Prop., 126 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1997) (requiring violation of actual court order);
Transatlantic Bulk Shipping Ltd. v. Saudi Chartering, S.A., 112 F.R.D. 185, 189 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (noting that Rule 37(b) “provides for sanctions where a party fails to honor its disclosure obligations, especially after court orders”).
118. Quela v. Payco-Gen. Am. Creditas, Inc., No. 99 CV 1904, 2000 WL 656681, at *6
(N.D. Ill. May 18, 2000).
119. Brandt v. Vulcan, Inc., 30 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 1994).
120. Id. at 756 n.7.
121. Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing In
re Air Crash Disaster near Chgo. Ill. on May 25, 1979, 90 F.R.D 613, 620-21 (N.D. Ill.
1981)).
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ance of the discovery order and thus be unable to obey, sanctions are still
appropriate under Rule 37(b) because this inability was self-inflicted.”122
A federal court may also rely on its inherent power to remedy spoliation.123 This authority was recognized in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,124
where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal court’s inherent power
to remedy litigation abuse extends to “a full range of litigation
abuses,”125 and “can be invoked even if procedural rules exist which
sanction the same conduct.”126 Although Chambers did not specifically
treat spoliation, it is well-recognized that the inherent power doctrine
extends to judicial sanctions for spoliation of evidence.127 The Ninth Circuit, for example, has upheld a district court’s reliance on its inherent
power to dismiss a claim where a plaintiff intentionally deleted computer
data.128
b.

Remedies

Under either Rule 37 or the federal court’s inherent power to remedy
spoliation, the analysis regarding the appropriate sanction is “essentially
the same.”129 Similar to Illinois courts, federal courts that impose spoliation sanctions have broad discretion to fashion an appropriate sanction,
which might include adverse jury inferences,130 exclusion of evidence,
and dismissal or default judgment.131 In crafting an appropriate sanction, district courts should seek “to serve the prophylactic, punitive, and
remedial rationales underlying the spoliation doctrine.”132 Indeed,
122. Id.
123. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); Kronisch v. United States, 150
F.3d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir. 1998).
124. Chambers, 501 U.S. 32.
125. Id. at 46.
126. Id. at 49.
127. See, e.g., Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2006).
128. Id.
129. Larson v. Bank One Corp., No. 00 CV 2100, 2005 WL 4652509, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
18, 2005) (collecting cases); see also China Ocean Shipping (Group) Co. v. Simone Metals,
Inc., No. 97 CV 2694, 1999 WL 966443 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999) (relying on both Rule 37
powers and the federal court’s inherent powers to dismiss a claim as a sanction for
spoliation).
130. See Midwest Trust Servs., Inc., v. Catholic Health Partners Servs., 910 N.E.2d 638,
642-43 (noting that spoliation “can support an inference that the evidence would have been
unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction or nonproduction”) (citing cases);
Nesbitt, supra note 120, at 560-66 (detailing how courts may employ an adverse inference
in spoliation cases).
131. See, e.g., Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642
(1976); Marrocco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1992); Patterson v. CocaCola Bottling Co., 852 F.2d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 1988). Cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (“Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with
restraint and discretion”).
132. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
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courts tend to evaluate sanctions across three dimensions: the culpability of the spoliating party;133 the degree of prejudice to the aggrieved
party; and the availability of appropriate lesser sanctions.134
Because the sanction of dismissal or default judgment is “considered
‘draconian,’” courts that impose this sanction are required, at minimum,
to make a finding of “willfulness, bad faith, or fault.”135 In Kapetanovic
v. Stephen J. Products, Inc., for instance, the court denied a sanctions
motion because of the movant’s inability to obtain specific documents did
not necessarily show bad-faith destruction of such documents.136 A finding of “willfulness, bad faith, or fault,”137 however, does not require dismissal, where, for instance, the spoliation caused only a small degree of
prejudice.138
Accordingly, litigation ending sanctions, such as dismissal or default
judgment, are reserved for the most serious abuses of the judicial process, including evidence fabrication and perjury.139 In REP MCR Reality, the third-party defendant moved for sanctions after discovering that
the third-party plaintiff fabricated three critical documents submitted
133. See Am. Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Roth, No. 05 CV 3839, 2009 WL 982788, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2009) (“Spoliation sometimes permits, but rarely if ever requires, the
ultimate sanction of dismissal of the case against the plaintiff or entry of default judgment
against the defendant.”) (citing Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir.
1998)).
134. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
135. Maynard v. Nygren, 332 F.3d 462, 467-68 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also
China Ocean Shipping (Group) Co., v. Simone Metals, Inc., No. 97 CV 2694, 1999 WL
966443 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999) (relying on Rule 37 and inherent power to dismiss claim
against defendant, where plaintiff destroyed a shipping container material to the litigation); Rodgers v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., No. 05 CV 0502, 2007 WL 257714, at *10 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 30, 2007) (opining that default judgment is “only to be employed in the most extreme
situations as a last resort and only where the plaintiff can show willfulness, bad faith, or
fault”). Cf. APC Filtration, Inc. v. Becker, No. 07 CV 1462, 2007 WL 3046233, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 12, 2007) (denying motion for default judgment, notwithstanding bad-faith conduct, because small degree of prejudice).
136. Kapetanovic v. Stephen J. Products, Inc., No. 97 CV 224, 2002 WL 475193 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 27, 2002).
137. Maynard, 332 F.3d at 467-68 (citation omitted); see also China Ocean Shipping
(Group.) Co., 1999 WL 966443 (relying on Rule 37 and the federal court’s inherent power to
dismiss a claim against defendant, where plaintiff destroyed a shipping container material
to the litigation); Rodgers, 2007 WL 257714, at *9-10 (opining that default judgment is
“only to be employed in the most extreme situations as a last resort and only where the
plaintiff can show willfulness, bad faith, or fault”). Cf. APC Filtration, Inc., No. 07 CV
1462, 2007 WL 3046233, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2007).
138. See APC Filtration, Inc., 2007 WL 3046233 at *5.
139. See, e.g., Pope v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 974 F.2d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding the
district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the claim where the party manufactured evidence); REP MCR Realty, LLC v. Lynch, 363 F. Supp. 2d 984, 998, n.12 (N.D. Ill.
2005) (collecting cases), aff’d 200 Fed. Appx. 592 (7th Cir. 2006).
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during discovery—two letters and one contract.140 In dismissing the
claim, the court reasoned that “dismissal with prejudice is not only proportionate to the offenses at issue, but any lesser sanction under the circumstances (such as merely excluding the fabricated documents) would
unfairly minimize the seriousness of the misconduct and fail to deter sufficiently such misconduct by others in the future.”141
One should note that, at least in federal court, generally applicable
rules of evidence might also remedy spoliation.142 This is particularly
true if a party attempts to use a spoliated document to refresh a witness’
recollection.143 Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which governs refreshing a witness’ recollection in federal court,144 permits a witness to refresh her recollection with almost anything.145 Indeed, as
Judge Hand opined: “[a]nything may in fact revive a memory; a song, a
scent, a photograph, and allusion, even a past statement known to be
false.”146
Even so, a district court retains discretion over whether and with
what to permit a witness to refresh her recollection.147 As the Eighth
Circuit has noted, it is improper to create a document for the purpose of
refreshing recollection, and allowing such a practice is considered “subterfuge for suggestion.”148
Reliability is one area in which parties have called upon courts to
exercise their discretion to limit the means used to refresh recollection.149 However, courts are cautious about preventing a witness from
refreshing her recollection even when reliability issues are raised.
III. INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION AS AN INDEPENDENT
CAUSE OF ACTION IN ILLINOIS
A. SOURCES

OF

AUTHORITY

Although the Illinois legislature could create a statutory cause of action for intentional spoliation, the most practical and likely means of creating such a tort is through the development of state common law.
140. Id. at 995-98.
141. Id. at 990.
142. See FED. R. EVID. 612.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967-68 (2d Cir. 1946) (Hand, J.).
146. Id.; see also United States v. DiMauro, 614 F. Supp 461, 466 (D. Me. 1984). (“It is
well established that on the laying of the proper foundation, a witness may be permitted to
use anything which the witness says will refresh his recollection as to the events to which
he testifies”).
147. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 365 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1966).
148. Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 759-61, n.11 (8th Cir. 1967).
149. See, e.g., id.
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As a leading torts scholar once noted, “[n]ew and nameless torts are
being recognized constantly, and the progress of the common law is
marked by many cases of first impression, in which the court has struck
out boldly to create a new cause of action, where none had been recognized before.”150 To this end, Illinois’ recognition of a tort for intentional
spoliation would be “largely a question of policy” for the Illinois judiciary.151 The Illinois legislature has not enacted significant statutory
remedies for spoliation,152 instead deferring to the sound common law
judgment of the courts.153 For instance, in Boyd, where the plaintiffs
brought an action for intentional and negligent spoliation, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that as a matter of state common law the plaintiff
could bring a claim under Illinois negligence law, rather than as a separate claim.154
Although the Illinois Supreme Court declined to recognize negligent
spoliation as an independent cause of action, Boyd supports the proposition that whether to permit such a cause of action in the future is largely
a question of policy left to the judiciary. Because the creation spoliation
tort may be a result of common law, the courts could tailor the cause of
action to address concerns that are specific to this State.155 These possible modifications, as discussed below, include fee-shifting and requiring
spoliation as a compulsory counter-claim.156
B. TOWARDS

AN

INDEPENDENT TORT

This Article argues that Illinois should recognize the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence, as doing so will further the policies of deter150. PROSSER ON TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971).
151. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (N.Y. 1979)
(Wachtler, J., concurring) (noting the court should consider the practical implications of
creating a new cause of action).
152. See KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 28, at 82. Yet, although not the same as an
independent cause of action, the Illinois Supreme Court has enacted Rule 219(c), which
permits Illinois courts to sanction a party for failure to comply with discovery rules and
orders.
153. See Emery v. Ne. Ill. Reg. Commuter R.R. Corp. 800 N.E.2d 1002, 1029 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2007) (citation omitted).
154. Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270-73 (Ill. 1995).
155. Wilhoit, supra note 24, at 643. Note that this Article advocates that the Illinois
Supreme Court provide an independent cause of action for intentional spoliation, not negligent spoliation. Id. This is because the idea of negligent spoliation as an independent
cause of action is foreclosed by Boyd, and, as a result, Illinois need not disturb this settled
case law. Id. This is especially true because Boyd permitted the same claim to be stated
under generally applicable negligence law and negligent spoliation implicates different policy concerns than intentional spoliation.
156. See supra Part III.1.c.
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rence, remediation, and certainty.157
To begin, regardless of how the Illinois Supreme Court would decide
the question, the court should, in the interest of certainty, expressly resolve this “open question.”158 As it currently stands, some courts applying Illinois law will permit an action for intentional spoliation,159 while
others will deny such a claim,160 and still others will construe a claim for
intentional spoliation as a claim for negligent spoliation under traditional negligence principles.161 These disparate outcomes are a result of
the Illinois Supreme Court’s refusal to resolve Boyd’s ambiguity.162
One problem with the uncertainty stemming from Boyd is that it
may give rise to forum shopping.163 While Illinois state courts appear to
be virtually unanimous in refusing to recognize intentional spoliation
claims, federal courts applying Illinois law have been more willing to embrace such claims.164 As a result, litigants seeking to assert spoliation
claims may have an incentive to bring their action in federal court.165
Although this does not directly implicate the Erie doctrine because both
state and federal courts apply the Illinois law of spoliation,166 the policy
rationale behind Erie—in deterring forum-shopping—might be implicated by how some federal courts have interpreted Boyd’s uncertainty.167
In resolving the uncertainty left by Boyd, courts should also consider
the value of deterrence. One cannot escape the reality that, whether negligent or intentional, spoliation has become increasingly problematic in
litigation.168 One commentator has proclaimed that “[w]e live in an era
of spoliation,”169 and a recent article reports that spoliation is not un157. See, e.g., West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999);
Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 127 (2d Cir. 1998); Wilhoit, supra note 24, at 66263.
158. See Jones v. O’Brien Tire & Battery Serv. Ctr., Inc., 871 N.E.2d 98, 115 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2007).
159. See, e.g., Williams v. General Motors Corp., No. 93 CV 6661, 1996 WL 420273, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 1996).
160. See, e.g., Farrar v. Yamin, 261 F. Supp. 2d 987, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
161. See, e.g., Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 510 (7th Cir.
2007).
162. See Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270-73 (Ill. 1995).
163. See Killelea, supra note 81, at 1052 (noting that similar facts may lead to different
results, depending on whether the spoliation claim is brought in state or federal court).
164. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. ABC-NACO, 906 N.E.2d 83, 100-02
(Ill. App. Ct. 2009). Additionally, resolving uncertainty in Illinois intentional spoliation
law is important for choice-of-law determinations.
165. See Killelea, supra note 81, at 1052 (noting that similar facts may lead to different
results, depending on whether the spoliation claim is brought in state or federal court).
166. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
167. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965).
168. See Gregory P. Joseph, Rule Traps, 30 NO. 1 LITIG. 9 (2003).
169. Id. at 9.
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common.170 “The human temptation to hide certain proof of one’s wrongdoing is powerful,”171 especially when one’s adversary does not know
that certain evidence exists.172 Spoliation is particularly troublesome in
products liability litigation,173 predominantly where courts will not permit a plaintiff to use a spoliation inference to withstand summary judgment.174 Although existing judicial sanctions for spoliation certainly
deter spoliation, these sanctions are not always sufficient.175 By recognizing a new tort, Illinois courts can further increase the cost of spoliation, thereby discouraging spoliation beyond that done by existing
sanctions. Put another way, even though existing litigation sanctions
certainly have their own deterrent value, creating a tort will further the
idea that “extra liability will make potential tortfeasors more cautious
about their actions, thereby deterring conduct that would be considered
tortious and undesirable.”176
Recognizing that potential spoliators cannot be completely deterred,
and that sometimes spoliation may be economically rational, an independent tort can nonetheless lessen one’s incentives to spoliate and, perhaps, make spoliators think twice before engaging in spoliation.177
Moreover, in the case of a third-party spoliator, existing sanctions would
do little, if anything, to deter the third-party who is not before the
court.178
Additionally, increasing the penalties for spoliation, and the associated risk exposure of a spoliating party, will serve to further protect the
integrity of the judicial system beyond the availability of sanctions. As
the Supreme Court of Montana opined, “[t]he intentional or negligent
destruction or spoliation of evidence . . . threatens the very integrity of
our judicial system. There can be no truth, fairness, or justice in a civil
action where relevant evidence has been destroyed before trial.”179 Another court echoed this sentiment, writing that “[t]he intentional destruction of evidence is a grave affront to the cause of justice and
170. Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1230 (2004).
171. See Nesbitt, supra note 120, at 557; see also Wetzel, supra note 25, at 457.
172. See Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation, The
Need for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793 (1991) (“By its nature spoliation
is invisible. The evidence may have been unknown to anyone but the spoliator. The act
itself need leave no trace”).
173. See, e.g., Laurie Kindel & Kai Richter, Spoliation of Evidence: Will the New Millennium See a Further Expansion of Sanctions for the Improper Destruction of Evidence?, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 687, 688 (2000).
174. See, e.g., Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 905 A.2d 1165, 1175 (Conn. 2006).
175. See, e.g., Ortega v. Trevino, 938 S.W. 2d 219, 221 (Tex. App. 1997).
176. Wilhoit, supra note 24, at 663.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 668.
179. Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 17-45 (Mont. 1999).
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deserves our unqualified condemnation.”180 Like the law of contempt,
permitting an independent cause of action here will reinforce one’s duties toward the court and discourage destructive behaviors.
Adequate compensation is another factor favoring the adoption of
intentional spoliation as an independent tort in Illinois.181 By adopting
such a tort, Illinois courts would more adequately compensate the injured party who has sustained a separate and distinct legal injury apart
from the underlying claim.182 In other words, when spoliation so frustrates a party’s claim as to prevent her from proceeding with her lawsuit,
the party suffers two legally cognizable injuries: 1) the underlying injury
upon which she brought suit; and 2) the denial of the opportunity to litigate that injury because of spoliation.183
Since deterrence focuses more on penalizing the spoliator than compensating the injured party, recognizing the tort of intentional spoliation
would allow the law to focus directly on the plaintiff’s right to recover. A
private right of action would further allow the injured individual to concentrate on being made whole. As William Prosser notes, “[t]he common
thread woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable interference with
the interests of others.”184 It follows that placing an injured party’s recovery in that party’s hands, rather than a court’s determination of appropriate litigation sanctions (if any), would afford the individual greater
protection and a better chance at achieving full recovery.
Although courts may impose sanctions on a spoliating party, or give
some benefit to a non-spoliating party through granting a default judgment or other mechanism, these sanctions may be insufficient to make
the injured party whole.185 Spoliation can often result in the destruction
or alteration of evidence that is critical to an on-going legal dispute; as a
result, the non-spoliator may never be able to vindicate her legal interest, especially where courts are hesitant to impose litigation ending
sanctions.186
As a basic matter, “[a] court will not always sanction a spoliating
party.”187 Furthermore, even if a court imposes sanctions, those sanc180. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 512 (Cal. 1998).
181. Wilhoit, supra note 24, at 665-66.
182. Id. at 663 (noting that spoliation is an important means to protect unliquidated
claims or legal expectancies); see also Marrocco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 220, 225
(7th Cir. 1992).
183. Nesbitt, supra note 120, at 579.
184. PROSSER ON TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971).
185. See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting,
as opposed to a criminal case, a “civil action for a tort . . . is commenced and maintained by
the injured person himself, and its purpose is to compensate him for the damage he has
suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer”) (internal citation omitted).
186. Nesbitt, supra note 120, at 577-78.
187. Killelea, supra note 81, at 1054.
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tions might be insufficient. For example, the decision whether to instruct the jury with an adverse inference instruction lies within the
discretion of the trial judge,188 and the jury is not required to follow such
an adverse inference instruction.189 Some jurisdictions will not even allow the inference to substitute for an “essential element” of a party’s
case.190 As with deterrence, this concern is especially true when applied
to third-party spoliators, who are not before the court, and thus not subject to any litigation sanction that the court might order.191
By recognizing the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence, Illinois
is not giving up on the traditional remedies for spoliation.192 Rather,
Illinois would be complementing these remedies and adding another
weapon to the judiciary’s arsenal in its war against spoliation.193 It
would also give the non-spoliating party another means to vindicate her
legal interest in the expectancy of her claim.
C. ADDRESSING CONCERNS
Recognizing the tort of intentional spoliation is not without concerns. Among these concerns are the speculative nature of damages, the
importance of finality in litigation, and the possibility of encouraging
frivolous claims.194 Another concern, which this Article discusses in detail above,195 is that an independent cause of action is unnecessary given
the traditional remedies.196 However, these concerns do not outweigh
the benefits of recognizing such a tort, especially when Illinois courts can
modify the doctrine to address any policy concerns specific to the state.
One concern about recognizing an independent tort for intentional
spoliation of evidence is the difficulty in ascertaining damages should
such a claim prevail.197 That is, damages are speculative: how can the
jury award damages on the unliquidated underlying claim, especially
188. Nesbitt, supra note 120, 561 n.27.
189. See, e.g., Killelea, supra note 81, at 1060 & n. 100.
190. Wilhoit, supra note 24, at 648.
191. Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)); Wilhoit,
supra, n.24 at 648 (citing Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. La.
1992).
192. Nesbitt, supra note 120, at 583.
193. See, e.g., Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold, Spindle, or Mutilate: The Trend Towards
Recognition of Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 57-58 (1993).
194. Nesbitt, supra note 120, at 583; see Killelea, supra note 81, at 1069-71.
195. See e.g., Ortega v. Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tex. App. 1997); Wilhoit, supra
note 24, at 633, 662-68; Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11 (Mont. 1999); CedarsSinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 512 (Cal. 1998).
196. Nesbitt, supra note 120, at 584 (suggesting that detractors view an independent
cause of action for destruction of evidence as “redundant and ultimately unnecessary”).
197. See Killelea, supra note 81, at 1069-71.
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when it has not gone to trial?198 But, this is exactly what the courts
invite the jury to do when the court instructs the jury with an adverse
inference about spoliated evidence.199 Moreover, the speculative nature
of damages is not unique to spoliation;200 other torts upon which Illinois
permits recovery, including wrongful death and slander, often have a
speculative quality to their damage calculations.201
Furthermore, it is inequitable to deny recovery in the face of intentional spoliation merely because the damages are too uncertain. This
idea was discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in an old case:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion
of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his
acts. In such case, while the damages may not be determined by mere
speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of
the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference.202

Consistent with this reasoning, denying recovery because of the
speculative nature of damages would undercut the deterrence rationale
of spoliation by reducing the consequences of spoliation.203 To the extent
this is a concern, though, Illinois courts could perhaps require the injured party to establish damages by a low standard, such as “reasonable
probability,” or “somewhat certain basis.”
Another concern that opponents of spoliation as an independent tort
cite is the importance of finality in litigation.204 Some have even suggested that an action for spoliation would violate res judicata.205 These
concerns, of course, are an important policy consideration, but they cannot be dispositive of the question. Smith, treated at length above, recognized the concern about finality, but reasoned that an action for
spoliation does not implicate the interests that the policy of finality seeks
to protect.206 That is, finality concerns seek to prevent the re-litigation
of the same cause of action, or collaterally attacking the judgments of a
competent tribunal.207 However, an action for spoliation, although indirectly getting into the merits of the case, focuses on conduct affecting the
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See 740 ILCS 180/1 (2010) (wrongful death); see also Smith v. Superior Court, 198
Cal. Rptr. 829, 835-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
202. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson P. Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
203. See Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835-36.
204. See Killelea, supra note 81, at 1069. Note that spoliation issues are often raised
before the underlying case has gone to trial, thus mooting any concern about finality.
205. Id.
206. See Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34.
207. Id.
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evidence in support of the underlying action.208 An action for spoliation
involves righting a wrong that was not addressed in the underlying action, namely the destruction of evidence.
To the extent this is a concern, however, Illinois courts can modify
its spoliation law to address the issue. One possibility is to require a
party to plead spoliation as a compulsory counter-claim once the injured
party has notice of the spoliation.209 This would consolidate the actions
and, perhaps, allow the trial judge to consider all claims together.
Another concern in creating the tort of intentional spoliation might
be the rise of open-ended, limitless liability for the spoliator. This concern, though, is easily addressed because the party bringing the action
would be required to prove the element of intentional or willful spoliation. This is no easy task. As one commentator has noted,
“[i]intentionality is exceedingly difficult to prove, particularly when inadvertence and misunderstanding are such easy alternative explanations.”210 Problems of direct proof of intent are difficult in many areas of
law and will often end up as a question for the trier of fact, if the matter
survives pre-trial motions.
Similarly, recognizing the tort of intentional spoliation would not
cause Illinois judges to “set sail on a sea of doubt.”211 Illinois case law is
robust with discussion of spoliation;212 in fact, a number of cases applying Illinois law treat intentional spoliation directly.213 To the extent Illinois case law is inadequate to assist judges in applying this new tort,
Illinois courts can borrow analysis from other jurisdictions that have
adopted the tort.214 These out-of-state cases would serve as persuasive
authority and lay the foundation for the development of the common law
of intentional spoliation in Illinois.
Finally, some might argue that creating a new opportunity for tort
recovery might open the door to frivolous litigation.215 As with any new
cause of action, this concern may have merit; yet, Illinois could compen208. Id.
209. Although Illinois does not otherwise provide for compulsory counterclaims, see 735
ILCS 5/2-608(a) (2010) (permissive counterclaim), this might be an opportunity to create an
exception along the lines of Federal Rule 13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13.
210. Nesson, supra note 190, at 793; see also Kedigh, supra note 230, at 606-07 (1999)
(suggesting that spoliators may also involve the actions of third-parties to make the intentional spoliation appear more like an accident).
211. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283-84 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft,
J.).
212. See supra Part II.1.
213. See supra Part II.2.a.2.
214. Nesbitt, supra note 120, at 614 (2007) (“Several jurisdictions already accept the
viability of the [intentional spoliation] tort, and Tennessee can be guided by their past
decisions in incorporating the action in the current common law.”).
215. Nesbitt, supra note 120, at 614.
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sate for this by modifying the tort in a number of ways. For instance, as
a matter of Illinois common law, if one brings an intentional spoliation
claim and loses, that person could be required to pay the alleged spoliator’s attorney’s fees and costs, or otherwise be sanctioned by the Court.
Similarly, a court might independently examine the evidence and issue
an Order to Show Cause why the action was not frivolous.
IV. CONCLUSION
Spoliation of evidence is a growing problem. As one commentator
proclaims, “we live in an era of spoliation.”216 Jurisdictions throughout
the nation have adopted a variety of different approaches to spoliation,
ranging from litigation sanctions to permitting an independent cause of
action.217 Illinois takes a somewhat hybrid approach, rejecting an independent cause of action for negligent spoliation, yet permitting a party to
bring such a claim under existing negligence law.218 Whether Illinois
permits an independent cause of action for intentional spoliation remains an “open question.”219 The uncertainty has resulted in confusion.
Weighing the policy issues at stake, this Article argues that the Illinois Supreme Court should recognize the tort of intentional spoliation.
This new tort, cognizable in a handful of other states and already permitted by some courts applying Illinois law, would complement existing
sanctions and further the state’s interests in deterrence, remediation,
and certainty. Although recognizing an independent tort for intentional
spoliation may raise some concerns, these concerns do not outweigh the
benefits of this tort action, especially where Illinois courts may modify
the tort to address policy concerns specific to the state.
216.
30 NO.
217.
218.
219.
2007).

Killelea, supra note 81, at 1069-71, 1069 (quoting Gregory P. Joseph, Rule Traps,
1 LITIG. 6, 9 (2003)).
Supra, Part II.1.
Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 269 (Ill. 1995).
Jones v. O’Brien Tire & Battery Serv. Ctr., Inc., 871 N.E.2d 98, 115 (Ill. App. Ct.

